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The West Coast Main Line mess is symptomatic of much
wider questions affecting the whole of Whitehall
The Department of Transport was subject to widespread criticism over the inadequacies
which became apparent in the West Coast Main Line franchising process. However Peter
Riddell argues that these were symptomatic of much broader issues afflicting Whitehall,
raising important  questions about the long-term sustainability of the coalition’s changes
within the public sector. 
Cuts have consequences. That is a central quest ion raised both by the
preliminary Laidlaw report  into the West Coast Main Line franchise shambles and by a new
report  on ‘Transforming Whitehall’ f rom the Inst itute for Government, about lessons from trying
to achieve far-reaching change in a number of  government departments. The problems at  the
Department for Transport  can be seen as a classic illustrat ion of  the tensions highlighted in the
IfG report .
The scale of  change and cutbacks are unprecedented and are ignored by the st ill too common,
t ired and inaccurate polit ical and media at tacks on privileged bureaucrats. The Civil Service lost
more than a tenth of  its posts in the 18 months following the start  of  the spending review,
more than was achieved in four years during the Thatcher era. Departments have, on average,
been ordered to making cuts of  nearly a f if th in real terms over four years including reduct ions
of at  least  a third in their administrat ive spending. The cuts are being made but can they be
converted into long-term sustainable changes?
The IfG report  underlines the dif f iculty of  achieving transformat ion and the risk of  rapid
turnover amongst senior of f icials, as well as the challenge of  maintaining staf f  mot ivat ion and
commitment. One of  the case studies is the Department for Transport , writ ten before the
problems over the West Coast Main Line franchise emerged. The cutbacks at  the centre of  the
department were designed and implemented rapidly f rom late 2010 unt il late summer of  2012.
The speed of  change, the report  notes, ‘necessitated some dif f icult  t rade-of fs, however. To
some in the department the change seemed to be too deep, too fast .’ Quite.
Move on to the preliminary report  on West Coast Main Line by Sam Laidlaw of  Centrica, the
lead non-execut ive director at  the department. This is an interim assessment, looking at  what
happened on the basis of  an incomplete view of  all the documents. The why and what can be
learned will appear in a f inal report  at  the end of  November.
Nonetheless, the interim report  raises some disturbing quest ions. The f lawed process of
awarding the franchise was not just  the result  of  mistakes by just  a few civil servants. No blame
has been apport ioned or responsibility def ined as this stage, Rather, the errors ‘appear to have
been caused by factors including inadequate planning and preparat ion, a complex
organisat ional structure and a weak governance and quality assurance framework’.
But how far did the cuts discussed above af fect  performance? Mr Laidlaw observes that ‘the
organisat ion has undergone a signif icant reduct ion in size accompanied by f requent changes
of leadership at  a t ime when the DfT’s agenda has been expanding’. There was a lack of
cont inuity and clarity in senior leadership, with the senior responsible of f icer for the f ranchise
programme changing three t imes during the course of  the compet it ion. ‘In implement ing
substant ial cost  savings, the DfT had signif icant ly reduced both its headcount and its use of
external consultants and specif ically f inancial advisers to support  the refranchising programme’.
These cutbacks were ordered by ministers and senior civil servants, not junior of f icials.
There was also ambiguity about the precise funct ions, authorit ies and inter-relat ionships of
various commit tees and boards within the DfT, notably over the treatment of  risk. These
concerns echo those raised in earlier reports by the IfG on Whitehall. These are being examined
in the Inst itute’s current major study of  accountability—where one of  the main quest ions is
confusion over the balance between accountability and responsibility.
Above all, there is the quest ion of  how much ministers knew—or should have known—before
they approved the award of  the f ranchise. The West Coast Main Line mess is symptomatic of
much wider quest ions af fect ing the whole of  Whitehall: about the impact of  cuts; the speed
and success of  t ransformat ion programmes; and the chains of  accountability within
departments and to Parliament.
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